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NOTE
ODD MAN IN: LOUISIANA ADOPTS THE ODD-LOT
DOCTRINE-A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
The most serious industrial risk which the law must address is
the permanent loss of a worker's ability to earn a living.' In some
respects, the plight of an injured worker is worse than death. He is
alive, but cannot earn a living. Determination of the extent of a
worker's disability is, predictably, the most difficult problem faced
by judges in interpreting a workers' compensation statute. Louisiana
courts have encountered unusual problems in this regard, for they
have acted against a background of inadequate supervision of
awards, liberal compromise provisions, no requirements of re-
habilitation, and almost no opportunity to modify the judgment once
rendered.' The societal stakes are high, for an error in evaluating a
worker's disability may doom him to impoverishment 3 and compel
the society as a whole to support him-a result entirely in conflict
with the compensation principle.'
As the risk involved is loss of the ability to earn a living, it is
quite appropriate to measure the disability resulting from industrial
accidents in terms of the worker's loss of earning capacity. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, in Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc.,' has
given the Louisiana courts the ability to analyze each claimant's
potential earning capacity by adopting the odd-lot doctrine as the
guiding principle in determing total disability:
Simply stated, the doctrine is that a claimant may be considered
1. Wilson v. Weyerhauser, 30 Or. App. 403, 567 P.2d 567. 571 (Ct. App. 1977).
2. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKER'S COMPENSATION § 276 in 13 Lout.
SIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 619 (2d ed. 1980).
3. Malone, Total Disability Evaluation Under the Louisiana Compensation Act,
20 LA. L. REV. 486, 508 (1960).
4. The principle is
that those persons who enjoy the product of a business-whether it be in the
form of goods or services-should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or
deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product .... The expected cost of injury or death to workers can be anticipated
and provided for in advance through the medium of insurance, and the premiums
can be regarded as an item of production cost in fixing the price of the commodity
or service .... [Tlhis cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in
the form of increased prices until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate con-
sumers.
W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2. at § 32.
5. 390 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1980).
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totally disabled if, after his injury, he is considered an "odd-lot"
in the competitive labor market, ie., that he may be capable of
performing various jobs from time to time, but that the kind of
work he may perform is so limited in quality, dependability or
quantity that a reasonably stable market for that work does not.
exist.'
Given the flexibility to resolve each controversy individually, the
courts should be able to "approach the task of evaluating a worker's
disability with an appreciation of the uncertainties involved,"7 and
atone for some of the traditional shortcomings still remaining in the
Louisiana's Workmens' Compensation Act.8 This paper will examine
the total and permanent disability standard used prior to the adop-
tion of the odd-lot doctrine, the doctrine itself, with particular em-
phasis on its application in other jurisdictions, and will conclude
with some suggestions for application of the doctrine in Louisiana.
Louisiana History of Total Disability
The Louisiana legislature adopted a "fundamentally conser-
vative"9 Compensation Act in 1914. "[D]isability to do work of a
reasonable character,"'" produced by a work-related injury, was con-
sidered as total under the Act. Injured employees covered by the
Act" no longer were required to prove fault on the part of the
employer.'" In return, the employee was forced to give up his claim
for damages for "compensation payable according to a definitely
limited schedule,"'3 based upon the extent of the disability. Disability
was classified as either partial or total, and either temporary or per-
manent." The paramount consideration in making the classification
was loss of earning capacity. 5 Once the extent of disability was
6. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term - Workmen's Compensation, 39 LA. L. REV. 881, 889 (1979).
7. Malone, supra note 3, at 504.
8. See the compensation principle in note 4, supra.
9. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 36, at 50.
10. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20.
11. For a discussion of employees covered by the Louisiana Workers' Compensa-
tion Act see W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at §§ 91-100.
12. Employees are only required to prove, by a reasonable preponderance of the
evidence, see Newell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 368 So. 2d 1158 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979); Barre v. Hong-Kong Restaurant Inc., 346 So. 2d 318 (La. App. 4th
Cir 1977); Van Vracken v. Bryant & Assoc., 338 So. 2d 981 (La. App. 4th Cir. 19761,
that they "received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment." LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
13. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 32, at 40.
14. LA. R.S. 23:12211)-(3) (Supp. 1975).
15. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 271, at 594.
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determined, compensation was recoverable for only a fixed number
of weeks.'"
The Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to this
phrase in Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Company.7 The Knispel
rule stated that whenever an employee was "unable to perform
work of the same or similar description that he ... [was] accustomed
to perform," the disability was deemed total within "the intendment
of the law."'"
The Knispel rule was refined in subsequent years. If a skilled or
semi-skilled laborer was unable to perform his special skill following
an injury, he was considered unable to perform work of "the same
or similar description that he was accustomed to perform" and
therefore was regarded as totally disabled. 9 The common laborer
was considered totally disabled if his injury substantially decreased
his ability to compete with able-bodied workers in the flexible
general labor market."
The skilled and common laborer tests were merely extensions of
the Knispel rule. However, these extensions led to inequitable
results, as the benefits of the Knispel rule effectively became
available only to skilled and semi-skilled workers.21 This result was
unfortunate because, arguably, the common laborer who lacks educa-
tion and skills is much more in need of any benefits proffered by
such a system than his more skilled counterparts.
16. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20, § 8.
17. 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
18. 174 La. at 410, 141 So. at 12 (where injury to the claimant's eye caused double
vision and prevented him from returning to his former occupation).
19. See Lindsey v. Continental Cas. Co., 242 La. 694, 138 So. 2d 543 (1962) (Lind-
sey was a farm equipment mechanic).
20. See Booker v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 389 So. 2d 84 (La. 1980); Ball v.
American Marine Corp., 245 La. 515, 159 So. 2d 138 (1963). The Knispel rule, as ap-
plied to common laborers, was based on the notion that all jobs in the flexible general
labor market are of the same or similar description. The common laborer, therefore,
was to be deemed totally disabled only if his injury decreased his ability to compete
with able-bodied workers for practically any steady job available.
21. Malone, supra note 3, at 506. Indeed, as Professor Emeritus Wex Malone has
pointed out:
The fact that the benefit of the Knispel rule is available to only the skilled or
semi-skilled worker, heightens an impression ... that human dignity is offended
when a skilled employee is obliged to undertake work that is less elevated than
that which he has been accustomed to perform. It is doubtful that considerations
of this kind should play a role of any importance in the administration of social
legislation.
Id.
In spite of the criticism it has received, some good reasons justify the use of the
Knispel formula. See generally .iL passim.
19821
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In addition, relief was afforded the laborer plagued by chronic
pain. Through a refinement of the Knispel rule, the injured
employee who would incur substantial pain by returning to his
former employment would be entitled to an award of total disability.
The cases indicated that a worker was not expected to work in pain
in order to make a living or to do so when it would increase
materially the hazards to his own health and safety, or would
jeopardize the well being of his fellow employees." To be considered
disabling, however, the pain had to be substantial and appreciable.23
In 1975, the Louisiana legislature again amended the Act, and in
so doing changed its character.2' "Disability of an employee to
engage in any gainful occupation for wages"25 is considered as total
under the new Act. In addition, the amended statutory definition of
partial disability2 is strikingly similar to the former judicial test for
total disability, a fact indicative of legislative intent to bring about a
new test for evaluating total disability. 7 Although the amended Act
does not refer to claimants working in pain, the courts have
declared that the working-in-pain jurisprudence "continues to be
viable" under the amended definition of total disability. 8 The 1975
amendments also eliminated any limit on the number of weeks for
which compensation is recoverable for total disability. With no such
limit, and in light of the apparent legislative intent to overrule the
existing judicial principles for estimating the claimant's disability,
the courts were given the opportunity to develop a rule which
would correspond to the character of the amended Act.
Following the 1975 amendments, there was much speculation
about how the courts might evaluate total disability. Some indica-
tions were given in Whitaker v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.," in
22. See Brannon v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 224 La. 166, 69 So. .2d
1, (1953).
23. See Bailey v. Schott & Co., Inc., 334 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976);
Breaux v. Kaplan Rice Mill, Inc., 280 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
24. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 893.
25. LA. R.S. 23:1221(1), (2) (Supp. 1975).
26. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3) (Supp. 1975). ("For injury producing partial disability of the
employee to perform the duties in which he was customarily engaged when injured or
duties of the same or similar character, nature or description for which he was fitted
by education, training, and experience . (. " (emphasis added).
27. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 885. See also Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders,
Inc., 389 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1980).
28. Whitaker v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980). This
result previously had been recommended. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 886. See also
Phillips v. Dresser Eng'r Co., 351 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 353
So. 2d 1048 (La. 1978).
29. 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980).
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which the evidence indicated that the injury rendered the claimant
unable to work without experiencing substantial pain. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, after declaring that the working-in-pain jurisprudence
contined to be viable, held that a finding of total and permanent
disability was in order. In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis
stated his belief that "substantial pain cases should be incorporated
into the broader analysis of disability using the odd-lot doctrine.""
Several months later, in Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders,
Inc., 31 the court denied compensation for total disability despite find-
ing, as did the court of appeal," that the claimant worked in
"substantial and appreciable" pain.3 Citing Whitaker, the court
distinguished the two situations by stating that "Mr. Dusang's pain
is not so strong as in Whitaker's case."3 After discussing the odd-lot
doctrine and its applicability to substantial pain cases, Chief Justice
Dixon discussed other evidence35 that, considered with the claimant's
alleged pain, convinced the court that the claimant was not entitled
to total disability benefits. The court observed that the claimant
was not a marginal employee; he had found work, and there was no
clear indication of possible inability to find work in the future. The
court indicated that substantial and appreciable pain alone was not
enough to support a finding of total disability, suggesting that it is
one of many factors to consider and is to be given weight propor-
tionate to the severity of the pain and its impact on ability to com-
pete in the labor market."
Approximately one month later, in Oster v. Wetzel Printing,
Inc.,3" the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the plight of a sixty-
30. Id. at 1097 (Dennis, J., concurring).
31. 389 So. 2d 367 (La. 1980). Claimant, employed as an ironworker and welder,
slipped on a wet concrete floor and injured his shoulder and wrist. After treatment he
returned to work and was employed as a welder, but he complained of constant pain.
Id.
32. Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 379 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979).
33. 389 So. 2d at 370.
34. Id. at 371.
35. The record indicated the following:
(1) Claimant had worked steadily since the accident;
(2) the alleged disability did not require hospitalization or absence from work;
(3) although claimant needed assistance in the performance of some tasks, his
employer never had to substitute another employee for him:
(4) claimant is not a marginal employee, for he has found work, and there is no
clear indication that he will not be able to find work in the future.
Id. at 372.
36. A pain so severe as to prevent claimant from performing any function what-
soever could be sufficient to support a finding of total disability. See also note 76, in-
fra, and accompanying text.
37. 390 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1980).
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one year old bookbinder who was injured while attempting to unclog
a printing machine. The claimant, who was right handed, lost large
portions of the index and middle fingers of her right hand, and sus-
tained severe lacerations of her ring finger as well. She suffered
from hypersensitivity in the injured area, and the injury also caused
her certain emotional problems. She had no formal education past
one year of junior high school, and her previous employment had
been limited to manual labor as a bookbinder for the past fifteen
years."' The claimant argued that she was no longer capable of per-
forming her old duties 9 and sought benefits based upon total and
permanent disability.
The court declared that the odd-lot doctrine was to be used as
the guiding concept in determining total and permanent disability:
In determining whether an employee is permanently and totally
disabled, it is not a prerequisite that he be absolutely helpless.
If the evidence of his physical impairment and of other such factors
as his mental capacity, education, and training indicate that he
can perform no services other than those which are so limited in
quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable
market for them does not exist, the injured employee is entitled
to total disability compensation unless the employer or his in-
surer is able to show that some form of suitable work is regularly
and continuously available to the employee within reasonable
proximity to his residence."0
Applying the doctrine to the facts of the case, the court held that
Mrs. Oster was totally and permanently disabled."
The Oster decision marks the beginning of a new era of total
disability determination. Although the odd-lot doctrine is in its in-
fancy in Louisiana, it is by no means an untested legal theory. The
doctrine has it roots in England,'2 and it has been utilized in many
other jurisdictions. Indeed, traces of an odd-lot analysis can be found
in some of the Louisiana cases applying the Kinspel rule.'3
38. Id. at 1324.
39. Id. at 1322.
40. Id. at 1320.
41. The court concluded that due to to Mrs. Oster's "severely injured hand, her
neurosis, her lack of education and her age," id. at 1324, she could perform no services
for which a reasonably stable market would exist. Furthermore, the court found the
defendant's evidence insufficient to rebut Mrs. Oster's prima facie showing.
42. The origin of the doctrine has been traced to language used in 1911 by Judge
Monlton in Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K.B. 1009.
43. See Futrell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 271 (La. 1973). See
also cases cited in Lewis v. St. Charles Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 337 So. 2d 1137 (La.
1976) (former Justice Tate writing for the majority).
In addition, the common laborer test evaluates the worker's ability to compete with
[Vol. 42
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While the language employed by each jurisdiction may differ,
the doctrine is essentially the same in all jurisdictions which apply
it. The court must look at the totality of the evidence in assessing
the claimant's disability."' The underlying question is whether the
worker can compete with able-bodied workers in the labor market in
the absence of business booms, sympathy, temporary good luck, or
super-human efforts by claimant to rise above his handicap.'5 The
focus of the inquiry is the claimant's ability to get a steady job,
because inability to obtain steady employment has been described as
"tantamount to the inability to perform work."'"
The odd-lot doctrine will not eliminate the difficulties of total
and permanent disability evaluation that courts have encountered in
the past, for most of the basic reasons for the creation of the
Knispel rule still exist.'7 The doctrine is not intended for, nor
capable of, mathematical application. What the doctrine will do,
however, is to give the courts a mechanism to determine fairly and
accurately the extent of each claimant's disability. An individual
determination should eliminate the possibility that an injured
employee could obtain a higher paying job in a dissimilar field and
still receive total disability compensation."
The doctrine should give the courts the ability to examine the
factors peculiar to each claimant." The following analysis of the doc-
trine is largely based on its applications in other jurisdictions.
Although some of the most important and frequently recurring fac-
tors are listed, the list is by no means exclusive.
Presentation of Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case for classification in the odd-lot
category, the claimant must demonstrate that a combination of fac-
tors have placed him at a substantial disadvantage in the labor
able-bodied workers in the flexible general labor market. See Ball v. American Marine
Corp., 245 La. 515, 159 So. 2d 138 (1960), where the court afforded the common laborer
basically the same treatment as he would have had in other jurisdictions under the
odd-lot analysis. See also Malone, supra note 3, at 506.
44. "The law fixes disability in terms of loss of earnings capacity, which includes
the extent of physiological impairment as only one factor." Futrell v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 271, 274 (La. 1973) (citing W. MALONE, LOUISIANA
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 272 (Supp. 1964) (emphasis added)).
45. A. LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.50, at 10-18 (desk ed. 1977).
46. Kumpf, Unemployability and the Odd-Lot Doctrine in Worker's Compensa-
tion, 102 N.J.L.J. 2, 2 (1978).
47. See note 2, supra, and accompanying text.
48. 390 So. 2d at 1323 (La. 1980).
49. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 276.
1982)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
market."0 The claimant's prima facie showing is significant because
"such proof .. .satisfies his burden of proving that he should be
awarded benefits for permanent and total disability,"5' and places
the onus on the employer to show that jobs are available to claimant
which will provide steady income." In determining whether the claim-
ant has established his prima facie case, the courts should not weigh
one element more heavily than another, but rather should examine
how various factors have affected the individual's ability to compete
in the labor market. Furthermore, the impact of individual factors
upon the claimant-not the quantity of factors-is determinative of
odd-lot status."
Physical Impairment
Any physical infirmity undoubtedly will limit the type of work
the claimant will be able to perform.' A truck driver suffering from
a severe injury to a leg resulting in permanent impairment might
find it difficult to re-enter that job market. Limitation in use of the
leg might interfere with the "safe and adequate performance" of his
job." Furthermore, the claimant's physical condition will limit the
location in which he can perform those tasks." For example, a claim-
ant confined to a wheelchair due to a work related injury might en-
counter problems in trying to secure employment in a small town.
The degree of physical impairment will be a factor in the vast
50. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 890. Other jurisdictions employ slightly different
word formulas, but in essence, they all require the claimant to demonstrate that he
probably no longer possesses earning capacity. See, e.g., Bradly v. Henry Townsend
Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323 (1979) (unemployable on a regular
basis in a reasonably stable job market).
51. 390 So. 2d at 1324 (La. 1980).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 335 A.2d 642 (1979), in which
evidence indicated that the work related accident left the claimant with a deformed
hand. The deformed hand and a language barrier were sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.
54. The physical infirmity need not stem entirely from that accident.
The jurisprudence indicates that an employer takes an employee as he finds him.
An employee's injury is compensable if a work-related accident aggravates or ac-
celerates a pre-existing condition to produce disability .... An employee who is
abnormally susceptible to disability from the accident is entitled to Workmen's
Compensation benefits even though the same accident or injury would have caus-
ed little or no harm to a healthy employee.
Weller v. Brown, 398 So. 2d 551 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). See also Cadiere v. West Gib-
son Prods. Co., Inc., 364 So. 2d 998 (La. 1978); Crawford v. Al Smith Plumbing &
Heating Services, Inc., 352 So. 2d 669 (La. 1977).
55. Lee v. Pratt-Fransworth Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981).
56. See Whitaker v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980). Cf.
Celestine v. Henry Indus., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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majority of cases57 because compensable injury, by definition, must
result from "violence to the physical structure of the body."58
Therefore, physical damage is a likely consequence, resulting
possibly in some degree of infirmity. Should the infirmity render the
claimant absolutely helpless, the inquiry need proceed no further,
and compensation for total and permanent disability should be
awarded. Otherwise the impairment should be analyzed with regard
to the effect that this injury will have on the earning capacity of the
claimant."
Mental Capacity
The mental capacity of the claimant often determines the scope
of potential jobs for which he may be trained. Claimants with low in-
telligence quotients are in a more precarious position than their
more gifted counterparts following industrial accidents which render
them unable to return to their former employment." They are thus
more deserving of assistance in finding employment under the terms
of the odd-lot doctrine, for they are less likely to be capable of
retraining themselves and competing in the labor market with able-
bodied workers.
57. See Perez v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 95 N.M.2d 628, 624 P.2d
1025 (Ct. App. 1981). The claimant found it necessary to take frequent rest breaks due
to pain in his lower back and legs. He was performing only sixty percent of the work
he was doing before the injury, and evidence indicated his worsening condition even-
tually would render him unable to perform his duties. "A severe pain, however, which
does disable a workman is compensable injury. . . . A workman may retain all of the
normal bodily functions of his organs and still be so weak or be in such pain that he
would be totally or partially disabled from retaining or obtaining remunerative
employment." 624 P.2d at 1032 (citation omitted).
58. LA. R.S. 23:1021(7) (Supp. 1975); Cf. Franklin v. Complete Auto Transit Co.,
397 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981). See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at §
211. for a detailed discussion of how the courts have interpreted this language.
59. A claimant possessing the mental capacity necessary to train himself for
another job may not be capable physically of undertaking such a rehabilitation pro-
gram. Jenness v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 493 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1972) (claimant, suf-
fering from pain in his lower back, could not sit longer than 30 to 40 minutes; he had
difficulty in standing for more than 45 minutes, and a "sense of weakness" in his left
leg caused him to fall from time to time when walking).
60. Claimant's intelligence quotient is relevant in determining whether he can be
rehabilitated. Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 18 Utah 2d 390, 424
P.2d 138 (1967) (a counselor of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation testified that
due to claimant's low intelligence quotient, he believed rehabilitation was impossible).
"One with a low intelligence quotient cannot be expected to learn a new trade or
calling and thereafter sell his services in the labor market as readily as a more gifted
person might do." Rooney v. Charles, 262 Ark. 695, 560 S.W.2d 797. 800 (1978) (clai-
mant, a sixty-one year old laborer with an intelligence quotient of fifty had no special
skills which were transferrable to another job; his formal education had ended in the
third grade). See also Turner v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1980)..
1982]
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Education
An employee with very little education is likely to encounter
greater difficulty in seeking a new job than will a high school or college
graduate, and many of the jobs available to a person with the claim-
ant's physical handicap might be restricted to only high school or
college graduates." An Oregon court has correctly concluded, how-
ever, that the fact that claimant was well educated will not alone be
sufficient to defeat a claim for total and permanent disability. 2
Training
The less training an individual has, the more difficult it will be
for him to overcome his handicap because "the demand for unskilled
and semi-skilled workers has been rapidly declining with the advent
of mechanization and automation and the great bulk of hard core
unemployment in the United States is in these categories.""3 On the
other hand, a claimant with training in a wide variety of job areas
will be at less of a disadvantage upon re-entering the job market by
virtue of his varied skills."4 In 1981, in Allor v. Belden Corp.,"5 the
61. "lIlt is a matter of common observation that a man whose sole stock in trade
has been the capacity to perform physical movements, and whose ability to make those
movements has been impaired by injury, is under a severe disadvantage in acquiring a
dependable new means of livelihood .... A. LARSON, supra note 45, at § 57.50, at
10-20.
62. Claimant, a thirty-five year old high school graduate with no formal training
whose work experience had been limited to farm labor, was declared totally disabled.
Miller v. I.P. Miller Lumber, Inc., 19 Or. App. 730, 528 P.2d 1100 (Ct. App. 1974).
63. A. LARSON, supra note 45, at § 57.60, at 10-25. However, if claimant's physical
impairment is not total and permanent, and she is able to do light work, the fact that
she has no training for specific jobs and does not know what kind of work she can do
will be insufficient to justify a finding of permanent disability. Potterf v. State Acci-
dent Ins. Fund, 41 Or. App. 755, 598 P.2d 1290 (Ct. App. 1979); Briggs v. State Acci-
dent Ins. Fund, 36 Or. App. 709, 585 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1978).
Although claimant may have training in only one area and his injury prevents him
from returning to work at the same job he was performing prior to the accident, his
expertise in the field may indicate that other jobs in that area are available. Claimant
may be able to compete for those jobs on an equal footing with able-bodied workers.
For example, in one case a classified machinist's job related accident rendered him
capable of handling only light duties. After the injury, claimant was promoted to shop
foreman. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins., Co. v. Applewhite, 612 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
64. Unwillingness to apply these skills and training "to a job reasonably within his
present abilities" does not render a claimant permanently and totally disabled. Audas
v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 43 Or. App. 819, 604 P.2d 428, 429 (Ct. App. 1979). In
Audas, the claimant had taken courses in construction estimating and architectural
drafting; he also passed his high school GED and received training from the division of
vocational rehabilitation. Unable to return to his job as a roofer, claimant was unwill-
ing to apply his training to find employment.
65. 393 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1981).
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Louisiana Supreme Court took into consideration the claimant's
"varied work history"' " in holding that he was not entitled to total
and permanent disability benefits. The claimant had failed to
establish a prima facie case of odd-lot status because he had not
shown that, in light of his education, training, and physical cond-
ition, he would be at a severe disadvantage in competing with
others in the labor market."
Age
The older the claimant, the more difficult it will be for him to
find employment. The younger the claimant, the better the chances
that, in time, he will be able to overcome his handicap and eventually
be self-supporting. An employer, seeking to fill jobs requiring some
degree of training, probably would be more eager to hire the
younger disabled employee than his aged counterpart." After
rehabilitating the worker, the employer naturally can expect the
thirty-five year old employee to remain in his employ longer than
his sixty year old counterpart. However, the odd-lot doctrine gives
the judiciary the opportunity to treat each controversy individually,
and each claimant's age should be considered with, and not apart
from, the other relevant factors. In some situations the sixty year
old will have greater job prospects than a thirty-five year old, and
the courts should remember that job marketability is the major con-
cern.
6 9
Pain
The vast majority of the claimants seeking odd-lot status will ex-
perience some degree of pain. However, not every degree of pain
should play a part in the awarding of total disability benefits. Unless
the pain is substantial,"0 no societal notions of decency are offended
66. Claimant had received a high school equivalency degree and was trained in
the Marine Corps as a heavy equipment engineering mechanic. He had in the past
operated heavy equipment, driven trucks and wreckers, tended bar, and managed a
service station. At the time of the accident he was a cook in the Louisiana National
Guard. Id.
67. Id. at 1237.
68. Older workers may have the advantage in certain circumstances; but in the
majority of cases the preponderance of evidence suggests that the older claimant
would encounter greater difficulty in seeking employment.
69. "The fact that a person has worked ... long past retirement age, does not ef-
fect that person's eligibility for benefits .. " Findorff v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 295 N.W.2d
373 (Minn. 1980) (the seventy-two year old claimant, feeling himself capable of return-
ing to work, had not tried to find work and offered no evidence indicating the lack of
available jobs for which he was qualified; he was found not to be totally disabled).
70. The claimant must prove disabling pain to a legal certainty and fair
preponderance of the evidence. The totality of the evidence, including the medical and
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by refusing total disability benefits to a claimant experiencing some
lesser degree of pain, and thus requiring him to work. Indeed, one of
the purposes of the odd-lot doctrine is to promote rehabilitation of
injured employees.
To an employer, a worker seeking employment who will ex-
perience substantial pain in performing assigned tasks will not be
particularly desirable," and such a worker will thus find his oppor-
tunities severely limited." Moreover, the pain the prospective
employee experiences may restrict the scope of activities he may be
able to perform." Absenteeism might also be a problem." Further-
more, the pain may make the prospective employee more susceptible
to a second injury, and the employer will be liable for the resulting
disability.75 Thus, substantial pain may place a worker at a serious
disadvantage when he seeks employment and, consequently, should
be considered with other factors in determining the claimant's odd-
lot status.
Situations surely will arise in which the claimant will experience
substantial pain in the performance of some jobs but not in others.
Should those jobs which the claimant could perform without experi-
encing substantial pain be realistically unavailable to the claimant
due to a combination of other factors, a prima facie case conceivably
could be established. However, a claimant's substantial pain, in com-
bination with other factors, must place him at a disadvantage in
competing for the available jobs, or he will have failed to establish a
prima facie case.
Substantial pain alone, like physical impairment, may in some
circumstances be sufficient to establish a prima facie case."0 An in-
jury which will subject the claimant to unbearable pain in his every
movement, if not in fact rendering the claimant unable to perform
any tasks, clearly would place the claimant at a severe disadvantage
in seeking employment, regardless of how well-trained or gifted the
claimant might happen to be. Indeed, to require a claimant to work
in unbearable pain would be contrary to the social policy of the
lay testimony, are to be considered to determine if he has carried his burden. Set
Turner v. J. & J. Wells Contractors, Inc., 396 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
71. See Lattin v. Hica Corp., 395 So. 2d 690 (La. 1981).
72. Wilson v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248, 1252 (La. 1981).
73. Id. at 1252.
74. Id. For example, the employee would have to miss work on days when the
pain became particularly acute, and also on days he may require medical treatment.
75. Id.
76. "A worker may retain all of the normal bodily functions of his organs and still
be so weak or in such pain that he would be totally or partially disabled .... " Perez v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 95 N.M.2d 628, 624 P.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 1981).
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Act." However, in view of the potential for abuse, courts should
recognize a prima facie showing based solely upon substantial pain
only in the most extreme circumstances. A lesser standard would
lead inevitably to a higher percentage of total and permanent
disability awards, a result contrary to the "narrower definition of
total disability" very probably intended by the 1975 amendment to
the worker's compensation statute."8
In addition, courts should give less weight to a showing of
substantial pain in situations in which the claimant's condition will
improve only if he works, even if he must do so in substantial pain."
At first glance this rule may seem harsh and unduly favorable to in-
dustry. However, such a rule will serve to foster and encourage
rehabilitation, one of the purposes of the doctrine. In addition, a
finding of substantial pain should not establish conclusively total
and permanent disability. Substantial pain, as has been
demonstrated above, is to be used to establish the claimant's prima
facie case. The employer is then given the opportunity to come for-
ward and demonstrate that actual jobs are available to the claimant
within a reasonable proximity to his residence which the claimant
could perform without pain.
In Wilson v. Ebasco Service, Inc.," the Louisiana Supreme Court
announced that "a worker who cannot return to any employment
without suffering substantial pain is entitled to compensation. ...""
While the court's intent in this language is clear, the actual burden
the claimant must carry is uncertain. Surely the court did not intend
that a claimant prove the universal negative, i.e., that he will ex-
perience substantial pain in all types of employment, as that is ex-
actly what the odd-lot doctrine is designed to avoid. The burden on
the claimant should be to demonstrate that he does experience
substantial pain performing certain functions, and that the inability
to perform these functions, possibly with a combination of other fac-
tors, will place him at a serious disadvantage while competing in the
labor market.
The fact that a claimant may be working in pain at the time of the
77. One writer has stated that requiring a claimant to work in substantial pain
would be contrary to the social policy of the Act. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 886.
Unbearable pain, for the purpose of this note, is intended to mean the most severe
degree of substantial pain. Requiring a claimant to work in unbearable pain, a fortiori,
would likewise be contrary to the social policy of the Act.
78. 390 So. 2d at 1323.
79. Cf. Lattin v. Hica Corp., 395 So. 2d 690 (La. 1981) (Lemmon, J., dissenting)
(claimant was not motivated to undertake the activity necessary to lessen' the pain).
80. 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981).
81. Id at 1251.
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trial in an effort to support his family should not preclude a finding
of total and permanent disability on the basis of substantial pain."i
Furthermore, the judgment is to be made on the evidence presented
at trial, and should not be based on speculation as to whether the
pain will subside at some future date."3
Motivation
Louisiana is now one of the many states in which a claimant
found totally and permanently disabled will be entitled to compensa-
tion for the duration of the disability. Some believe that claimants
may feign injury in an attempt to reap potentially huge benefits. As
a result, the claimant's motivation to return to work has become a
very important consideration in the odd-lot analysis. Indeed, Justice
Lemmon recently made reference to the claimant's motivation, or
more correctly the lack of it, in his dissent in Lattin v. Hica Corp."4
Though not yet a significant factor in Louisiana jurisprudence,
motivation is a major factor in evaluating odd-lot status in other
jurisdictions. An excellent statement of the proper role of motiva-
tion appeared in Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund85 in which
the Oregon court of appeals stated:
1. Motivation is not necessary to establish a prima facie case of
odd-lot status if the medical facts, when considered along with
other factors, such as age, education, mental capacity and train-
ing, of themselves support the claimant's inability to work.
2. Evidence of motivation to seek and work at gainful employ-
ment is necessary to establish a prima facie case of odd-lot
status if the injuries even though severe, are not such that the
trier of fact can say that regardless of motivation this man is
not likely to be able to engage in gainful employment.8
82. "Claimant ...continued working with pain because he had a pregnant wife
and three children." Beatrice Foods Co. v. Clemons, 54 Ala. App. 150, 306 So. 2d 18, 20
(Cir. App. 1975). "The rule is established in this state that the fact that an injured
employee resumes work after an injury, but only under the whip of necessity, does not
necessarily preclude a finding of total permanent disability." Consolidated Under-
writers v. Whittaker, 413 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). When claimant disregards
his pain and continues to work due to "hardship and economic necessity" a finding of
total and permanent disability should not be precluded. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Peoples, 595 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
83. See Wilson v. Ebasco, 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981).
84. "Plaintiff was simply not motivated to undertake the activity necessary to
lessen the pain." 395 So. 2d 690, 694 (La. 1981) (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
85. 13 Or. App. 298, 509 P.2d 1215 (Ct. App. 1973).
86, Id at 1218. "The fact that claimant was highly motivated and felt optimistic
about gaining employment does not render him ineligible for odd-lot status when other
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The foregoing statement of the role of motivation in the analysis
was clarified and reaffirmed in Wilson v. Weyerhauser Company,87
which stressed that "motivation is not essential to the establishment
or disproof of a claim of permanent total disability." Motivation is to
be given equal weight with all other factors by the fact finder.88
Other courts have expressed similar views, 9 and some have car-
factors indicate that he will be at a disadvantage in competing for a job." McCoy v.
Transport Indem. Co, 27 Or. App. 437, 556 P.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1976). Claimant was a
sixty-six year old truck driver who sustained a back injury in a work related accident.
A vocational rehabilitation counselor had testified that the probabilities for employ-
ment were poor, and claimant was found totally and permanently disabled despite his
optimism.
87. 30 Or. App. 403, 567 P.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1977). Claimant, 53 years old with an
eighth grade education and no special skills, had worked his entire life at jobs involv-
ing heavy labor. An injury to his lower back rendered him unable to "place heavy
demands on his back." In addition he was unable to sit, stand or drive for prolonged
periods, and occasional numbness in his legs made him physically unstable. Claimant
sought and was refused employment at several locations, and a vocational rehabilita-
tion counselor concluded that there was no real prospect of retraining him for some
other employment.
88. 567 P.2d at 573. The court also stressed that motivation is not the thing to be
proved, "(it is] merely evidence of something else.... Motivation is only one among
many possible circumstances which may be helpful in determining ultimate facts." Id.
at 572. The relevant ultimate facts regarding motivation are availability of employ-
ment and extent of disability.
Availability of Employment: Factors such as claimant's unsuccessful attempts to
find employment or his refusal to accept "proffered employment for which he or she is
fit," id., are to be considered with the "entire mix of evidence" to determine if regular
gainful employment exists. Id.
Extent of Disability: Less severe emotional status
may reflect and be subject to claimant's exercise of will. As such, the injury is not
causal-it merely gives opportunity for expression of common work avoidance
desires. These mental states are not pathological, but attitudinal. The claimant's
attitude towards return to work, if positive, may be relevant in assessing whether
the condition excludes the claimant from the labor market, or if negative, whether
the claimant is excluded from employment by his or her own will rather than by
that of employers.
Id. at 572-73.
89. 'In Findorff v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. 1980), the
Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that claimant's lack of attempts to find unskilled
light work "may have evidentiary value, but we will not require an employee to seek
and be denied employment as a prerequisite to his claim for total disability benefits."
In Zanchi v. S & K Construction Co., 124 N.J. Super. 405, 411, 307 A.2d 138, 141
(1971), the claimant was a sixty year old functional illiterate with little educational
training and a work record of only very strenuous unskilled labor. Medical evidence in-
dicated that the heart attack (myocardial infarction) suffered at work rendered him
unable to do heavy or strenuous labor again. Although the claimant introduced no
evidence that he had tried to find employment, the court stated that such evidence,
while "valuable to the petitioner . . . , is not essential where other circumstances in-
dicate that the search for employment would probably be fruitless."
In Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1978). a sixty-five year
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ried the analysis further, indicating that motivation should be con-
sidered in light of certain psychological considerations. The trauma
of constant rejection for employment was considered in Barbato v.
Alsan Masonry & Concrete," in which reference was made to two
other claimants who had filed 40 and 100 job applications respective-
ly. Moreover, where injuries have resulted in physical deformities,
some courts have not subjected claimants to further emotional
stress by requiring them to seek employment in order to establish a
prima facie case."
Other Factors
The odd-lot doctrine gives judges flexibility in deciding perma-
nent total disability cases, and judges should take into consideration
any facts peculiar to the case which properly have been brought to
their attention. Reference to the mental state of the employee will,
at times, prove helpful.92 The claimant's lack of English fluency may
prove a barrier to finding employment in some cases." The
old male employed as a used car attendant suffered a collapsed left lung in the course
of his employment. Continuing to suffer from obstructive lung disease, the claimant
did not seek post injury employment. The court stated "a disabled employee need not
seek or be denied employment as a prerequisite to being found totally disabled. The
fact that the claimant has not sought post injury employment goes only to the eviden-
tiary weight of the assertion that he is totally disabled." Id. at 186.
90. 64 N.J. 514, 318 A.2d 1 (1973).
91. See A. LARSON, supra note 45, at § 57.50. See aLso Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N.J.
Super. 461, 184 A.2d 878 (1962) (claimant encountered laughter and disdain at his at-
tempts to find employment with his mangled hand).
92. The psychological ramifications of a particular injury, e.g., one leaving the clai-
mant with an obvious deformity, play a significant part in establishing total disability.
Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete, 64 N.J. 514, 318 A.2d 1 (1973).
Mental or emotional condition is often a contributing factor to incapacitation and
the severity of the mental condition may affect the extent of disability. Such con-
ditions may range in severity from psychopathological conditons such as chronic
depression at one end to self pity, malaise, or loss of ambition on the other. The
former class of recognized forms of emotional disturbances are significant
elements of the extent of disability in odd-lot cases where they complement the
physical injury. If caused by the industrial accident, mental conditions may
themselves constitute the injury.
Wilson v. Weyerhauser Co., 30 Or. App. 403, 567 P.2d 572, 573 (Ct. App. 1977). "A
broken body can cause a broken spirit." Seaberry v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 528
P.2d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 1974). Claimant, after suffering two back injuries in previous
employment, pursued and completed vocational training as a barber. Finding himself
unable to stand for long periods because of his back problem, the claimant was forced
to give up his work as a barber. The difference between psychopathological and at-
titudinal breakage is one of degree "which the fact finder must infer from all
evidence." 30 Or. App. at 403, 567 P.2d at 573.
93. In Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J.1, 8, 355 A.2d 642, 646 (N.J. 1976), clai-
mant, a native of Haiti, spoke very little English, and the court stated that "it is com-
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claimant's employment experience may be important if his record in-
dicates that he has been unable in the past to secure regular gainful
employment.94 In general, any facts relevant to the claimant's earn-
ing capacity should be considered. 5
Defenses
After the claimant has established a prima facie case, the defen-
dant employer or his insurer then has the burden of showing that
jobs are available within reasonable proximity to the employee's
residence which will provide regular and continuous employment to
a person in claimant's condition."' In Turner v. American Mutual In-
surance Company," for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court
remanded the case, stating that "[no evidence was introduced ...
that would establish that ...work was actually available, nor that
any employer would hire a person in Turner's condition over healthy
competitors."" To impose upon the employer the burden of deter-
mining whether regular employment is available for the claimant is
not considered unjust because "assuredly, if the labor market offers
employment to such a claimant, the normal facilities for the ascer-
tainment of that fact should be more easily available to an employer
of labor than an individual employee.''"9
The best evidence the employer could produce would be an offer
of employment or a referral to a prospective employer. The former
employer's refusal to hire the claimant will carry substantial
weight.00 Evidence that claimant has sought and was refused work
mon sense that his language difficulty would additionally hinder petitioner in obtaining
work in a competitive job market."
94. On the other hand, claimant's record of past failures may indicate that he will
not be a particularly desirable employee and that his employment experience could aid
him in establishing his prima facie case. The trier of fact should make the determina-
tion based on the particular facts of each case.
95. At least one other jurisdiction, New Jersey, has taken into account the fact
that Second Injury Fund liability was no longer available and as a result would
decrease the willingness of. employers to hire applicants who had been subject to a
previous injury. See Lewicki v. New Jersey Art Foundry, 76 N.J. Super. 358, 423 A.2d
645 (1980). Louisiana adopted a Second Injury Fund which entitles an employer to
reimbursement for compensation under certain circumstances. See LA. R.S. 23:1378
(Supp. 1975). "The purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to encourage the employment
of handicapped persons." Wilson v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981).
96. Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc., 390 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1980).
97. 390 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1980).
98. Id. at 1334.
99. Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N.J. Super. 461, 184 A.2d 878 (1962).
100. See Cohn v. Haile, 589 S.W.2d 600 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979). The refusal could be
for the previous job or for different work. Leonardo v. Uncas Mfg. Co., 77 R.I. 245, 75
A.2d 188 (1950). However, the refusal by the former employer should not be conclusive
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elsewhere is also an important consideration.'' Should the former
employer offer the claimant a job, on the other hand, the offer must
be actual rather than speculative,' 2 and the work must be for
regular and continuous employment. 3 Furthermore, the offer of
work must be a type which claimant can perform with his
handicap.'0 '
Employers in other jurisdictions have been allowed to satisfy
their burden through testimony by medical and employment ex-
perts.' 5 In the case of conflicting testimony by medical experts, the
court should give more credence to the testimony of a physican who
has examined the claimant shortly before the trial than to a physi-
cian who examined the claimant many months previous.'0 However,
the credibility of experts is not unassailable, and it should be
remembered that they are offering only opinions, not jobs.' 7
A further requirement is that the available job be within
evidence of disability in all circumstances. In some cases the employer simply has no
jobs which claimant can perform in his conditon. See Mastrogiovanni's Case, 332 Mass.
228, 124 N.E.2d 246 (1955) (Claimant contacted dermatitis while working at defendant's
plant. Evidence indicated that because of her condition she would be unable to return
to work for the defendant, but the condition would not prevent her from working
elsewhere).
101. See Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1. 355 A.2d 642 (1976).
102. See Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Mich. App. 740, 300 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App.
1980) (realistic and definite offer required).
103. Special jobs created grudgingly by the employer will not be sufficient. Allen v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 16 Wash. App. 692, 559 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1977).
104. Cf. Beth-Allen Ladder Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 417 A.2d
854 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1980) (claimant was discharged from post injury employment
because he was unable to do the work). See also Shaw v. Portland Laundry/Dry Clean-
ing, 47 Or. App. 1041, 615 P.2d 1134 (Ct. App. 1980) (claimant denied permanent and
total disability compensation when she refused an offer for work she may or may not
have been able to do).
105. See Barbato v. Alsan Masonry & Concrete Co., 64 N.J. 514, 318 A.2d 1 (1974).
See also Farley v. Wiliamette W. Corp., 25 Or. App. 903, 551 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1976)
(opinion of three experts that claimant could perform limited work precluded an award
of permanent total disability).
106. See Day v. Zenith Paper Stock Rag Co., 270 Minn. 420, 134 N.W.2d 4 (1965).
However, the testimony of a treating physician who has had "benefit of repeated ex-
aminations and sustained observation" is to be given more weight than the opinion of
an expert making only a cursory examination prior to trial. Rodriguez v. American
Int'l Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 621, 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
107. "The trial judge may accept or reject an opinion expressed by any medical ex-
pert depending on how impressed he is with the qualifications, credibility and
testimony of the experts." Rodriquez v. American Int'l Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 621, 624
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). An expert's speculative testimony about a job market with
which he is unfamiliar has little value. The expert must demonstrate actual availability
of jobs to rebut the claimant's prima facie showing. See Balczewski v. Department of
Indus., 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977).
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reasonable proximity to the claimant's residence. One commentator
has argued that in today's mobile society, requiring a claimant to
relocate to find employment is not unreasonable.' 8 While our society
is transient, the mobility of a disabled claimant is questionable. In
addition, requiring a claimant to move to a different area or to a
larger city to find work arguably is "contrary to natural human
rights."' °9 Requiring a claimant to drive long distances might be
equally undesirable.'
Other Considerations
No presumption exists that merely because a claimant is
physically capable of performing light work, steady employment will
be available."' However, an important inquiry in other jurisdictions
has been the effect of post injury employment on a claimant's
prayer for total disability benefits."'
According to Professor Larson, total disability judgments should
be influenced by "the duration and presumed permanence" of the
new job, especially if a conclusion that claimant has found steady
employment would be justified."3 Clearly, the jurisprudence requires
the employer to be ready to rebut the presumption established by
the claimant's odd-lot status."' If the job lacks permanence and fac-
108. See Juge, The Odd-Lot Doctrine, 27 Loy. L. REV. 69 (1981).
109. McMannis v. Mad-Ray Modular, Inc., 289 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1974).
110. Claimant may be unable to travel long distances in his condition. See
Celestine v. Henry Indust., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
111. In Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967), thE claimant was
a forty-six year old coal miner stricken with anthracosilicosis after thirty-three years
of work in the mines. Defendant's contention that claimant could still perform work of
a general nature could not guarantee that such light work would be available to a
worker with claimant's physical disability, limited education, and vocational
background. The law will not support a presumption that such light work will be
available; the defendant must prove its existence. 427 Pa. at 5. 233 A.2d at 891.
112. Simply because an employee has failed to find work does not establish con-
clusively that he cannot earn a livelihood in work of a reasonable character. On the
other hand, "a showing that after the accident the worker was in fact employed for a
while in another capacity does not establish per se that his disability is not total." W.
MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 276, at 624.
113. See A. LARSON, supra note 45, at § 57.60.
114. See Port Everglades Terminal Co., Inc. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1960) (a
claimant physically capable of performing light work which is available is not totally
and permanently disabled); Pulley v. Detroit Eng'r & Mach. Co., 378 Mich. 418, 145
N.W.2d 40 (1966) (claimant, formerly a common laborer, left a steady, higher paying
clerical job of his own volition and was denied compensation for total disability); cf.
Tretton v. Attwood Crawford Co., 202 A.2d 286 (R.I. 1964) (after his injury claimant
did return to his former employment and earned wages in excess of those he had earned
prior to his injury. When a successor employer informed him of an intention to reduce
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tors indicate that claimant will have trouble competing in the labor
market, that job should have little effect in evaluating the extent of
the disability."'
An additional consideration in other jurisdictions is the matter
of supplemental income for claimants."' The question is whether the
existence of such income should be considered by courts in deter-
mining the claimant's entitlement to odd-lot status. The
jurisprudence indicates that the answer is clearly in the negative.
While a claimant receiving income from other sources may be less
needy than his less fortunate counterpart, the issue is whether the
claimant can sell his services to the competitive job market. There
is no guarantee that income from these sources will be available in-
definitely. Some day the claimant may be thrust into a labor market
in which he can no longer compete.
Even if supplemental income were guaranteed to cover every
expense the claimant ever would incur, the fact remains that the
claimant has been rendered incapable of competing in the labor
market and will forever lose the possible fruits of his labor. One of
his pay, claimant quit the job and was unable to find regular employment. The court
denied claimant compensation for loss of earning capacity).
However, at least one court has allowed recovery for total and permanent disability
to a claimant who was attempting to rehabilitate himself and to do "some light work to
aid in his support and maintenance," especially where the "hours worked and wages
received were negligible when compared to pre-injury figures." Elliot v. Gooch Feed
Mill Co., 147 Neb. 612, 24 N.W.2d 561 (1946). In addition, the ability to perform limited
services, even though steadily, in one's own or family enterprise may not of itself be
sufficient to negate industrial unemployability. See Germain V. Cool-Rite Corp., 70
N.J. 1, 355 A.2d 642 (1976).
115. Claimant, formerly a journeyman boilermaker, was unable to perform the
heavy tasks required for that job. He had been employed as a boilermaker foreman, a
job requiring only light tasks, for five months at the time of the trial. The temporary
employment, even though it had lasted five months, was to be considered with other
relevant factors in determining the impairment of future earning capacity. Shroyer v.
Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 388, 405 P.2d 875 (1965).
Another issue is whether finding a job because of the claimant's relationship with
the employer should preclude a finding of total and permanent disability. In Stebbins
v. Dodge County Service Co., 309 Minn. 563, 564, 244 N.W.2d 55. 55 (1976), the court
held that such a job should not preclude a finding of disability, stating that "the
employee should not be penalized for this effort to create a work situation that would
not be available in the regular competitive job market."
116. Income from a business owned by claimant should not be used to reduce
disability unless the income results "almost entirely from personal management and
endeavor." Connolly v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 301 A.2d 109, 112 (Pa.
Comm. Ct. 1973). Furthermore, a return from investments should not have the legal ef-
fect of negating unemployability. Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70 N.J. 1, 355 A.2d 642
(1976). Receipt of social security benefits by claimant, however, "does not necessarily
mean that he has withdrawn from the labor market, nor does it mean that claimant no
longer has earning capacity." McQuade v. Vahising, Inc., 377 A.2d 469 (Me. 1977).
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the underlying reasons for granting compensation is to prevent the
claimant from becoming a burden on society. This reason for
compensation does not exist in a situation in which the claimant is
guaranteed a supplemental income sufficient to cover living ex-
penses. However, the claimant has suffered greatly from an in-
dustrial accident, and someone should pay for the loss. If the accident is
covered by compensation, no other remedy against the employer
will exist."' Therefore, the claimant, having possibly no other
remedy, should be allowed to seek compensation; and if he can no
longer compete in the labor market, the supplemental income should
not effect the claimant's attempt to establish his prima facie case.
For many of the same reasons mentioned above, the possibility
of recovery of damages from a third party"8 should not play a part
in evaluating total and permanent disability. In addition, the
legislature has provided a scheme for the apportionment of damages
recovered in such suits,"9 and the claimant will benefit only if the
award of damages exceeds the total amount of the compensation
awarded.'20 Therefore, the claimant will not be reaping a double
recovery unless his employer fails to intervene in the suit.'2' Any
relation such a possible recovery could have on the ability of the
claimant to compete in the labor market is too speculative and
tenuous to warrant consideration.
Another consideration is whether the determination of the claim-
ant's ability to compete in the labor market should be influenced by
his filing for unemployment compensation. This question was ex-
amined in Jackson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,'2 in which
the claimant had filed for unemployment compensation, asserting
that he was physically able to work. Although claimant's stated
belief that he was able to -work in his application for unemployment
compensation and his prayer for total disability benefits in compen-
sation appear to be contradictory positions, the Jackson court reached
117. See LA. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1976); see also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 531
(1972). But see LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976).
118. See LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976). Claimant's compensensation remedy against
his employer will not "impair existing claims against third persons." 2 W. MALONE &
A. JOHNSON. supra note 2, at 180.
119. See LA. R.S. 23:1101-1103 (Supp. 1976). See also LA. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1976).
120. See LA. R.S. 23:1101 (Supp. 1976).
121. 1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 369, at 182. If the employer
fails to intervene in the suit, he loses his claim to reimbursement of compensation
already paid to the claimant. Since lump sum payments are quite common, the loss to
the employer is potentially large. However, as the employer must be given notice of
the suit, LA. R.S. 23:1102 (1950), such a result does not seem unjust.
122. 386 So. 2d 1049 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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a correct solution.'23 The court stated that the application "must be
considered with all other evidence, but it does not in itself preclude
plaintiff from recovering benefits at the time he was applying for
unemployment compensation benefits."' 2' A claimant's belief that he
is able to perform some work does not mean necessarily that some-
one will give him a job.
Procedure
Other jurisdictions have tried to impose a procedural framework
within which odd-lot cases are to be litigated.'25 Louisiana courts
should adopt some orderly procedure, and the model below is sug-
gested." In order to put the defense on notice that odd-lot status
will be sought, the claimant should be required to state in his
pretrial memorandum that he intends to utilize the doctrine. At the
close of the claimant's case, the employer or his insurer could ask
the judge to make a determination of whether a prima facie case has
been established. If the judge rules affirmatively, the employer or
his insurer must attempt to rebut the prima facie showing by
presenting his own evidence of claimant's earning capacity or of job
availability. Should the employer or his insurer fail to present such
evidence, a finding of total and permanent disability is in order.
123. Recovery of compensation from both systems for the same period of time is
prevented by law. See LA. R.S. 23:1601(7)(b) (Supp. 1978). See.also Harris v. Woodcrest
Mobile Homes, 359 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
124. Id at 1050.
125. For a discussion of the New Jersey system, see Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp., 70
N.J. 1, 8, 355 A.2d 642, 647 (1976). See also Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving &
Storage Co.. 78 N.J. 532, 397 A.2d 323, 324 (1979).
126. Some similarities exist between the proposed system and the New Jersey
system. The actual burden the claimant must carry in establishing his prima facie case
is unclear. One New Jersey court has held that if the claimant has presented his prima
facie case and the employer offers no proof of employment availability, the claimant
may be found to have failed to satisfy his ultimate burden-proof by a preponderance
of'the evidence. Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534,
397 A.2d 323, 324 (1979). This holding implies that the prima facie case can be
established in that jurisdiction by less than a preponderance of the evidence.
The position taken by the New Jersey court should not be followed in Louisiana.
Requiring the claimant to demonstrate his prima facie case by a preponderance of the
evidence is a more desirable approach. As claims are not tried before a jury, the prima
facie showing is not designed, as in the case of res ipsa loquitur, as an evidentiary aid
to help the claimant escape a directed verdict. A lesser burden would be more consis-
tent with the doctrine because it would allow more claimants the benefit of having
their past employers aid in finding work, but the lesser burden would be very
danagerous in light of the potentially large awards. Furthermore, the claimant's
ultimate burden is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and a lesser burden to
establish the prima facie case may prove to be of little aid in carrying the ultimate
burden.
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Otherwise, the claimant must establish his claim for total and per-
manent disability by a preponderance of the evidence.
By the very nature of the odd-lot doctrine, burdens of proof can
often best be carried with the introduction of expert testimony."
The expertise of vocational experts can be utilized to demonstrate
to the court the availability of jobs. The use of such specialists has
presented a discovery problem in applying the doctrine,"8 in that no
provision exists in either the Act or in the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure which would provide for the testing of the claimant by an
employment expert. Although the court can appoint an expert at
trial to aid in deciding the case," the efficient administration of
justice would be facilitated if a provision allowed the claimant to be
examined by a vocational expert in advance of the trial. The in-
terests of justice would be served'if the employer were allowed to
have the claimant examined by his own expert to prepare his
defense. The claimant already is required to submit to a physical ex-
amination;'3 an evaluation by a vocational expert would be no
greater intrusion upon his privacy.
One writer has expressed concern that the application of the
odd-lot doctrine in Louisiana, because of our "vast pool of citizens of
little education and limited training," will have a marked effect on
Louisiana's already high weekly compensation rate, as "these in-
dividuals are the most difficult group of workers to place in jobs."'3 '
Although insurance premiums may indeed rise, such an increase
may not be justified. Compensation insurance rates for each in-
dustry are based upon the possible wage loss of employees in the in-
dustry, the safety record of the industry, and the compensation act
in that jurisdiction. One of the reasons Louisiana ranked among the
leaders in the amount of insurance premiums paid in the past was
the Knispel formula,'32 which was designed by the Louisiana courts
to make up for the shortcomings of the statute.'33 That formula, by
encouraging nuisance claims which were largely settled by com-
promise, had the effect of "frittering away the pool of funds.""u But
with the demise of the formula, the class of individuals who had
benefited previously from the rule will no longer have a claim for
127. See Bradley v. Henry Townsend Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 533,
397 A.2d 323, 324 (1979).
128. See Juge, supra note 108 at 69.
129. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 192.
130. See LA. R.S. 23:1121 (1950).
131. Juge, supra note 108, at 184.
132. Malone, supra note 3, at 506.
133. ld. at 508.
134. Id. at 507.
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total disability benefits. Therefore, the overruling of the Knispel for-
mula need not have the effect of increasing premiums.
The argument also could be raised that the potentially higher
awards of the new Act will cause premiums to rise. Although com-
pensation is payable for the duration of the disability, the persons
most likely to fall into the odd-lot category will be those advanced in
age.'35 Although their work-life expectancy may be greater than the
previously imposed limit on the number of weeks in which compen-
sation was payable, in most instances the increase will not be very
great. One of the purposes of the odd-lot doctrine is to aid the in-
jured employee in finding a job. The number of those who eventually
will be entitled to benefit for total and permanent disability may be
reduced by the number who have found employment through appli-
cation of the odd-lot doctrine. Therefore, the impact of the elimina-
tion of the number of weeks compensation is payable will not be as
great as one might expect initially if the odd-lot doctrine is applied.
Younger employees occasionally may qualify for odd-lot status
and conceivably could receive huge benefits; that result might force
premiums to rise. However, if a younger employee should be faced
with the prospect of going through life totally unemployable due to
a work related injury, the only socially acceptable remedy is to
grant him a judgment for compensation, thus permitting him to sup-
port himself for the rest of his life and removing the potential
burden on society. The cost should be borne by the enterprise as a
cost of doing business and passed on to the consumer,'36 even if the
net effect is to increase premiums. Dealing with the genuinely
disabled employee is the primary reason for the existence of the
Compensation Act.
One might also argue that the odd-lot doctrine is unacceptable
because the employer should not be held accountable for disability
which results, in part, from many factors which are beyond his con-
trol. While total disability often will result from a combination of
factors under the odd-lot doctrine, the fact remains that claimant's
total disability was triggered by his work-related accident. The
employer is undoubtedly in the best position to distribute the loss.
Furthermore, the reasons supporting compensation when the clai-
mant's injury was the sole cause in rendering him totally in-
capacitated apply equally to situations in which a combination of fac-
tors render the claimant unemployable.
135. Johnson, supra note 6, at 892.
136. "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman." W. PROSSER,
supra note 117, at 530.
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Even if the net effect of applying the odd-lot doctrine in Loui-
siana should be an increase in premiums, more important factors are
involved than the limited education and training of the workers to
which the increase can be attributed. Some of the most dangerous
industries in the country are found in Louisiana, and these same in-
dustries have high wage rates. Clearly, many of Louisiana's workers
encounter a high risk of great danger, and to attribute an increase
in insurance premiums solely to the lack of education and training of
the people involved is to address merely a part of the problem.
Conclusion
The primary concern addressed in a compensation statute is, and
should remain, the plight of the injured worker. Courts should
[aipproach the task of evaluating a worker's disability with an
appreciation of the uncertainties involved and . . . be inclined to
so shape their definition of disability as to lessen somewhat the
chance that the worker will suffer thereafter because of the
uncertainty of medical estimates or from any unpredictable
changes in the economy or from the caprices of human nature.
This is best demonstrated ... by the . . . "Odd Lots" doctrine. 31
The above passage exemplifies the importance of assessing the
plight of each claimant in evaluating disability. In addition, the
potential for large awards militates against making total disability
awards indiscriminately.'38 The odd-lot doctrine, with its emphasis on
the plight of each claimant, should prove an acceptable principle for
evaluating disability.
Calvin P. Brasseaux
137. Malone, supra note 3, at 504.
138. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at § 276, at 626.
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